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LEMON LIvEs
Danwl 0. Conkle*
In Lee v. Weisman,1 the Supreme Court held that a public
school could not sponsor a prayer as part of its graduation ceremo-
ny In so ruling, the Court explicitly declined to abandon its pre-
vailing Establishment Clause doctrine, as embodied in the test of
Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 Even so, Professor Paulsen claims that the
Court in Weisman has effectively repudiated Lemon.3 He argues
that- Lemon has been replaced by a test of coercion, a test
that-with modifications-he strongly prefers to the Lemon ap-
proach. I disagree with Professor Paulsen, both normatively and
descriptively I support the basic test of Lemon, and I believe that
it survives the Weisman decision.4
I
For nearly half a century, the Supreme Court has enforced a
relatively strict separation of church and state. In Everson v. Board
of Education,5 the Court ruled that the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment would be applied to state as well as federal ac-
tion,' and that it would be construed to forbid not only the prefer-
ential treatment of particular religions, but also the furtherance or
support of religion in general.7 Over time, the doctrine announced
m Everson evolved into the three-part test of Lemon.8 This test
* Professor of Law and Louis F. Niezer Faculty Fellow, Indiana Umversity School of
Law at Bloomington.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
3. Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 795, 797 (1993).
4. Professor Paulsen expresses his glee with this poetic refrain: "Let the joyous word
be spread, Lemon v. Kurtzman at last is dead!" Id at 799. I hear a different chorus: "By
a vote of four to five, Lemon v. Kurtzman is still alive."
5. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
6. Id at 15-16.
7. Id
8. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (analysis of the Establishment
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requires that governmental action be supported by a secular pur-
pose, that it not have the principal or primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion, and that it "not foster 'an excessive govern-
mental entanglement with religion.'" 9 In recent years, the Court
has refined the test of Lemon by emphasizing the "endorsement or
disapproval" inquiry initially proposed by Justice O'Connor." Un-
der this reformulation, the critical inquiry is whether the
government's action, either in actual purpose or reasonable per-
ception, works to endorse or disapprove religious beliefs."1
Using the Everson doctrine and the Lemon test (both with and
without the O'Connor modification), the Court has invalidated
numerous governmental practices.12 These invalidations have led
to persistent charges that the Court is hostile to religion. 3 At the
same time, however, the Court has upheld other practices that
would seem to violate a stringent reading of Everson and Lem-
on.14 One might think that this would please the Court's critics,
but it does not. Rather, they use these decisions as evidence that
the Court's approach is unprincipled and unworkable, if not inco-
herent. 5
I read the Court's decisions differently. Where others see
hostility to religion, I see something more complex. Where others
see unworkable incoherence, I see the exercise of judgment.1 6 I
Clause "must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court
over many years").
9. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
10. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989); Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 61 (invalidating a statute authorizing a moment of
silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" in public schools because its purpose was to
endorse religion); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S.
472, 479 (1973) (invalidating a statute providing reimbursement to church-sponsored
schools for costs of complying with various testing and reporting requirements).
13. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 85 (Burger, J., dissenting) (criticizing the invalida-
tion of a moment-of-silence statute as indicating hostility toward religion).
14. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding city's inclusion of
creche in broader Christmas display); Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976) (upholding noncategorical grants to church-sponsored colleges and universities).
15. Professor Paulsen sounds these familiar themes in his discussion and critique of the
Court's decisions. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 801 ("Not all the resulting decisions
[after Lemon] were wrong ... but they certainly lacked doctrinal coherence.").
16. I do not defend all of the Court's applications of Lemon. Especially in the area of
funding for parochial education, some of the Court's decisions have turned on exceedingly
fine distinctions. See GERALD GuNTHER, CoNsTmmoNAL LAW 1509-10 (12th ed. 1991).
But even if there have been improper or inconsistent applications of the Lemon standard
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see the Court attempting to protect the sensibilities of religious and
irreligious minorities. I see the Court attempting to promote a reli-
giously inclusive political community, not by mindlessly excluding
religion from American public life, but rather by a context-specific,
case-by-case analysis of particular problems.
Despite its deqeptively formulaic phrasing, the Lemon test is
not, and has never been, a talismanic rule of law. As the Court
wrote in Lemon, "the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is
a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the cir-
cumstances of a particular relationship."17 Yet Lemon does repre-
sent a particular vision of the Establishment Clause. According to
this vision, religion is valuable, but we should be suspicious of
governmental attempts to support it. As the Supreme Court wrote
in Engel v. Vitale,8 "religion is too personal, too sacred, too ho-
ly, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate." 19
The Court explained that "a union of government and religion
tends ... to degrade religion"2' and to cause people to lose re-
spect "for any religion that ha[s] relied upon the support of gov-
ernment to spread its faith." 2 In short, governmental "support"
for religion can be illusory, if not counterproductive.
Even if the governmental action does little or no good for the
religion it favors, however, it is likely to harm the religious and
irreligious minorities who fall outside the government's embrace.
Religious or irreligious convictions often lie at the core of personal
identity. Like race or ethnicity, a person's stand on religious ques-
tions can define the very essence of his or her being. When gov-
ernment acts to favor the religion of some of its citizens, more-
over, the government itself is taking a stand. This stand reflects the
government's approval of the preferred religious beliefs, but it also
reflects a corresponding disapproval of competing beliefs.
To citizens whose beliefs are disapproved, the government is
sending a message of disrespect. Indeed, the government's action
may amount to a symbolic, but nonetheless painful, assault on their
in particular cases, it does not follow that the standard should be abandoned altogether.
17. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). In making this comment, the
Court was speaking with particular reference to the "entanglement" inquiry.
18. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
19. Id at 432 (quoting 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Reli-
gious Assessments, in THE WRrrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1901)).
20. Id at 431.
21. Id
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most fundamental sense of self. They may suffer not merely em-
barrassment, but even humiliation, this at the hands of their own
government.' Perceiving the governmental action as an
exclusionary slap in the face, they may respond in kind, distancing
themselves from the political community that has done them
wrong. Their loyalty may be shaken, thereby weakening the politi-
cal community itself.'
Properly understood, the Lemon test is designed to prohibit the
government from supporting religion in a manner that shows a lack
of respect for religious or irreligious minorities.2 4 But this hardly
provides a categorical rule. In the first place, the government is
generally free to support religion by adopting laws that embody
ethical or moral standards derived from religious teachings.' Even
with respect to more purely spiritual matters, moreover, the govern-
ment can act to accommodate private religious activity.26 Indeed,
if the injury to minorities is slight and the pull of a time-honored
tradition is strong, the government sometimes can go beyond ac-
commodation to provide limited support for spiritual activities.27
In each of these situations, the government's action in some sense
furthers or honors particular religious beliefs, and therefore argu-
ably shows a lack of respect for competing beliefs. Even so, there
are other considerations at work: protecting societal traditions, for
example, or protecting the rights of religious citizens to participate
in the political process or to engage in religious practices free from
22. See Richard S. Kay, The Canadian Constitution and the Dangers of Establishment,
42 DEPAUL L. REV. 361, 368 (1992) (noting the feeling of humiliation felt by a Jewish
family in reaction to a Christian prayer given during a public middle school's graduation
ceremony).
23. Cf Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 (history suggests that when government aligns itself
with a particular religion, it inevitably incurs -the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of
those who [hold] contrary beliefs-).
24. For a more complete explanation and defense of this interpretation of Lemon, see
Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1113, 1172-82 (1988).
25. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause,
67 MND. L.J. 1, 5-10 (1991).
26. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Cr. REV. 1;
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 685 (1992).
27. See Conkle, supra note 24, at 1183-87 (arguing, for example, that the long-sanc-
tioned references to God in the national motto and Presidential proclamations should not
be declared unconstitutional). To suggest that tradition is relevant is hardly to subscribe to
the -if traditional, therefore constitutional" approach that has been advocated by Justice
Scalia. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678-86 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the burden of governmental restraints.
In any given case, one or more of theie competing consider-
ations may be at work. More generally, our constitutional system
values representative self-government, suggesting that the power of
judicial invalidation should be exercised with caution. As a result,
even outside a traditional setting, it might not be sufficient to
identify de minimis support for religion, which might inflict de
minimis harm on religious or irreligious minorities. All of this
suggests that Establishment Clause analysis should be context-spe-
cific, and that it should include a quantitative assessment of the
extent to which the government is supporting religion and thereby
causing harm to minority citizens.
In its original formulation, the Lemon test clearly recognizes
that Establishment Clause analysis is a matter of degree. Thus, the
second prong of Lemon inquires whether the "principal or primary"
effect of the government's action is to advance or inhibit religion,
and the third asks whether any entanglement between religion and
government is "excessive." Although the first prong appears to
state more categorically that the government must have a secular
purpose, this requirement has been interpreted in a manner similar
to the other parts of the test. Thus, the government can act for re-
ligious as well as secular purposes as long as its religious purpose
does not predominate.28
Justice O'Connor's modification focuses the Court's attention
more directly on the principal harm that Lemon seeks to re-
dress-the harm that religious or irreligious minorities may suffer
when the government endorses, or at least appears to endorse,
religious beliefs they do not share. But this does not eliminate
questions of degree. Whether an impermissible endorsement is
present, either in actual purpose or reasonable perception, depends
on the context and on the extent to which the government's action
supports the favored religion.29
28. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590, 593 (1987) (finding that a law
violated the first prong of Lemon because it had a "preeminent" religious purpose and
"the primary purpose ... of advanc[ing] a particular religious belief"); id at 599
(Powell, J., concurring) ("A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of
a state legislature. The religious purpose must predominate."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 681 n.6 (1984) ("Were the test that the government must have 'exclusively
secular' objectives, much of the conduct and legislation this Court has approved in the
past would have been invalidated.").
29. Cf. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593 ("Because the primary purpose of the Creationism
Act is to advance a particular religious belief, the Act endorses religion in violation of
1993]
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Whatever its precise formulation, the essence of Lemon is a
context-specific inquiry that requires the exercise of judgment. The
Court must examine the government's purpose and the effect of its
action, as well as the resulting relationship between religion and
government. It must consider the degree to which the government
is engaged in favoring or endorsing particular religious beliefs and
the degree to which this action might harm religious or irreligious
minorities."° Lemon does not provide a categorical, bright-line
rule. Through its applications of Lemon, of course, the Supreme
Court creates precedents that control the resolution of particular
questions, thereby giving context-specific guidance to lower courts
and to other governmental officials.31 But Lemon itself provides
no more than a general standard, or "helpful signpost," 32 for
evaluating Establishment Clause challenges.33
II
Critics argue that the Lemon test, with or without the
O'Connor modification, is unacceptable and must be replaced. One
prominent alternative is a test of coercion. Under a coercion test,
the Establishment Clause would not be violated unless the govern-
ment's action in some way coerced religious or irreligious minori-
ties. Noncoercive injuries would be irrelevant. In theory, such a
the First Amendment.").
30. As the Supreme Court recognized long before it formally embraced the Lemon cri-
teria, "The constitutional standard is the separation of Church and State. The problem, like
many problems in constitutional law, is one of degree." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
314 (1952).
31. As Professor Karst has noted:
No bright-line rule will do all the work that needs to be done in protecting
both the value of religious freedom and the value of inclusion. During the two
decades of the Lemon test's preeminence, the Supreme Court has. given guid-
ance not so much by the formula as by the outcomes of the cases it has de-
cided.
Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of
Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 529 (1992).
32. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
33. As the Court has explained:
In each case; the inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule
can be framed. The Establishment Clause like the Due Process Clauses is not a
precise, detailed provision in a legal code capable of ready application. The
purpose of the Establishment Clause "was to state an objective, not to write a
statute."
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 668 (1970)).
[Vol. 43:865
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test would provide a bright-line rule for Establishment Clause cas-
es, or at least a rule that would be far more clear than the Lemon
standard. The government would be perfectly free to endorse or
support religion, as long as it avoided the forbidden coercion. At
least to this extent, critics might claim, a coercion test would be
more sympathetic to religion.
Whether a coercion test in fact would be more sympathetic to
religion depends upon whether religion actually profits from gov-
ernmental attempts to endorse or support it. As I have suggested,
the government's efforts may be unhelpful or even counterproduc-
tive.' Whether a coercion test would provide a clear rule of deci-
sion depends upon its precise formulation. Professor Paulsen's
coercion test, for example, provides protection both from required
participation in religious exercises and from required attendance at
such exercises.35 With respect to either participation or attendance,
moreover, his test forbids the government not only from coercing
"through direct legal sanction (or threat thereof)," but also from
coercing in more subtle ways, such as by placing conditions on the
receipt of benefits.36
This is hardly a bright-line rule, particularly with regard to
subtle coercion. As a result, even those accepting Paulsen's state-
ment of the test would likely differ on its proper interpretation in
particular situations. In the public school context, for example,
Professor Paulsen argues that teachers cannot lead their students in
voluntary prayer, because students cannot opt out without forfeiting
their right to maintain the privacy of their religious opinions.37
One could argue that religious "released time" programs create
much the same problem, but Paulsen suggests that they should be
treated differently. He argues that such programs, even when con-
ducted on the school's own premises, are not coercive as long as
there are legitimate alternatives available and as long as students
are required to opt in rather than out of the religious instruction."
In the context of Weisman itself, Paulsen supports the Court's
34. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
35. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 797.
36. Id (emphasis removed).
37. Id at 847 (stating that because of privacy guarantees implicit in the First Amend-
ment, it is problematic when -individuals are required by the government to identify and
publicly declare their religious beliefs or lack thereof").
38. Id at 853 ("[S]o long as the administration of the opt-in does not authorize teach-
ers to direct or influence student choice, there is none of the subtle, 'raise-your-hand-and-
identify-yourself' coercion involved in the school prayer context.").
1993]
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result, arguing that the government cannot require attendance at a
religious exercise as the condition of attending one's own gradua-
tion. But he suggests that if the prayers had been offered at the
private initiative of a speaker, the result might properly have been
different. In this latter situation, according to Paulsen, "government
is not requiring attendance at a religious ceremony, but is requiring
attendance at an event where it does not have control over the
content of what a speaker says." 39 Likewise, Paulsen argues that
public teachers are free to engage in personal religious activities on
the school premises, whether in after-school meetings4° or even in
the classroom. That they may serve as "role models," he writes,
does not transform their religious behavior into governmental coer-
cion.42 Governmental coercion would be present, however, if
teachers "use[d] their official positions to exert pressure" on stu-
dents to join them.43 Paulsen's analysis thus depends heavily on a
distinction between private action and public responsibility. But this
is a line that can be exceedingly difficult to draw, and Paulsen's
coercion formula in no way requires the particular distinctions he
has suggested.44
To be sure, Professor Paulsen's test is no less clear than Lem-
on, and it may even be somewhat more precise. Lemon, after all, is
decidedly vague. And whatever the interpretive difficulties with
Paulsen's test, other coercion tests might be easier to apply. Even
so, clarity is not the only criterion for an acceptable doctrine of
constitutional law. A gain in clarity might come at the cost of
significant constitutional principles and policies. For example, the
39. Id. at 838 n.155. A similar distinction might be appropriate under Lemon. Cf. Lee
v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("If the State had
chosen its graduation day speakers according to wholly secular criteria, and if one of
those speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen to deliver a religious message,
it would have been harder to attribute an endorsement of religion to the State.").
40. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 849 (arguing that although the private actor and state
actor roles are intertwined, the "mere fact of teacher participation in religious meetings
does not constitute state compulsion to attend them").
41. Id. at 850 (arguing that a teacher may engage in personal religious activity in the
classroom as long as the teacher's students have the ability to distinguish between the
teacher's "individual expression and his or her official expression").
42. Id. at 849.
43. Id at 850. As examples of coercive behavior by a teacher, Professor Paulsen cites
speech uttered in the teacher's official capacity to a captive audience of students or a "di-
rective instruction on what a student is to do during a 'moment of silence.'" Id
44. For further elaboration of the interpretive difficulties presented by Professor
Paulsen's formula, see Ira C. Lupu, Which Old Witch: A Comment on Professor Paulsen's
Lemon is Dead, 43 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 883, 890-93 (1993).
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adoption of a coercion test would sacrifice our constitutional inter-
est in discouraging the government from inflicting noncoercive
harms on religious and irreligious minorities.45
To say that we have a constitutional interest of this kind, of
course, is to interpret the Constitution in a particular way, and this
requires a theory of constitutional interpretation. One might take a
narrow view of the Constitution, including the Establishment
Clause. Professor Paulsen's analysis, for example, suggests that one
should focus exclusively on the original meaning of the constitu-
tional text." I take a broader view. I read the Constitution more
expansively, as a living, growing document. Viewed in this fashion,
the Constitution is not limited to its original meaning. Rather, it
can accommodate the changing texture of our society, historical
and developing traditions, and evolving understandings of the prin-
ciples and policies that it is read to reflect. With respect to the
Establishment Clause, this kind of constitutional - interpretation
permits the Supreme Court to expand the original meaning of the
Clause to provide broader protection against governmental attempts
to support religion.
In my view, Lemon is preferable to a test of coercion. A test
of coercion might provide an easier test, but only by divorcing the
Court's analysis from various relevant factors, including the pres-
ence or absence of noncoercive injuries. Reasonable minds may
differ, but I believe that the constitutional gains arising from Lem-
on outweigh the problems that Lemon entails, including the prob-
lem of vagueness.47 Critics might charge that this preference for
Lemon is unprincipled and indefensible. But like the application of
Lemon in particular cases, a general preference for Lemon, in my
45. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
46. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 839-41. Elsewhere I have argued that an original-
meaning approach to the Establishment Clause is severely compromised by the problem of
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation. See Conkle, supra note 24, at 1129-45.
47. Much of the contemporary debate about the Establishment Clause derives from a
jurisprudential dispute concerning the propriety of flexible standards, such as Lemon, as
opposed to more definitive rules of decision. Compare Steven D. Smith, The Rise and
Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 218
(1991) (suggesting that "a viable constitutional dobtrine" demands "uniform rules to be
expounded by courts and implemented in an across-the-board fashion") with Karst, supra
note 31, at 529-30 (arguing that under any appropriate Establishment Clause formula,
"some cases will be easy and some will be hard. The one certainty is that judges will
have to exercise judgment.'). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court,
1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
26 (1992) (arguing that the debate about rules versus standards explains many of the
current divisions on the Supreme Court).
19931
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view, is supportable as a matter of judgment.
I
By now it should be clear that when I refer to Lemon, I am
referring to a pragmatic test for evaluating Establishment Clause
challenges. This test considers the purpose and effect of the
government's action and the resulting relationship between religion
and government. Whether the Court literally recites the Lemon
formula is less important than whether it honors the policies that
Lemon represents. The endorsement language of Justice O'Connor,
for example, is fully consistent with the essence of Lemon. More
generally, the Court's analysis and results are more important than
any linguistic formula. In the sense I have in mind, "Lemon" refers
less to a particular set of words than to a general frame of refer-
ence, a general method for evaluating Establishment Clause chal-
lenges. Indeed, one of the major differences between Lemon and a
test of coercion is that Lemon requires an exercise of judgment that
proponents of the coercion approach are anxious to avoid. As I
have explained, this exercise of judgment involves a range of con-
siderations, including the noncoercive injuries that governmental
support for religion can inflict.
48
At least on this understanding, I believe that Lemon survives
the Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman.4 9 In their con-
curring opinions in Weisman, four justices embraced some version
of the Lemon approach," but another four, in dissent, moved in
the direction of a coercion test.51 The critical opinion is that of
the ninth justice, Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion
in Weisman, speaking for himself and the four concurring justices.
48. See supra notes 16-33 and accompanying text.
49. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
50. See id at 2663-64 (Blaclknn, L, joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concurring)
(applying the basic principles of Lemon to the facts); id. at 2667 (Souter, 3., joined by
Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (declining to require state coercion beyond state
endorsement of religion as a necessary element of an Establishment Clause violation).
51. Id. at 2683-85 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.L, White and Thomas, JJ., dis-
senting). Even the dissenters suggested that they would apply a Lemon-like test to pre-
clude a "sectarian" endorsement of particular religious beliefs. Id. at 2683-84 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that America's constitutional tradition forbids "government-sponsored
endorsement of religion-even when no legal coercion is present.. . where the en-
dorsement is sectarian, in the sense of specifying details upon which men and women
who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world, are known to
differ").
874 [Vol. 43:865
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Focusing on particular language in this opinion, Professor Paulsen
contends that Kennedy embraced a coercion approach. I offer a dif-
ferent interpretation.
To apply a test of coercion, one first must identify the kinds
of decisions that are protected from coercion. Under Professor
Paulsen's test, for example, one is protected in deciding whether or
not to attend a religious ceremony.52 Second, one must determine
whether the government has engaged in coercion with respect to
such a decision. Under Professor Paulsen's test, this coercion can
be direct or indirect; it can involve direct compulsion under force
of law, or it can involve more subtle pressure. For example, the
government may place individuals on the horns of a dilemma,
influencing their protected decision by providing a governmental
benefit only on the condition that they forego their protected
choice.
Justice Kennedy's opinion, however, did not follow this kind
of straightforward analysis. Although Kennedy stressed the problem
of coercion, he did so in a manner suggesting that he was also
concerned about noncoercive injuries. In addition, Justice Kennedy
strongly emphasized the extent of the state's involvement in direct-
ing and sponsoring the challenged prayers.53 If the test is coer-
cion, however, the precise degree of the state's involvement with
religion is not important. Either the state has coerced a protected
decision or it has not.
In discussing the "fundamental limitations imposed by the
Establishment Clause," Justice Kennedy wrote that "at a minimum,
the Constitution guarantees that government not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise."-4 But Kennedy
added that government also is forbidden to "otherwise act in a way
which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to
do so."' 5 This latter statement clearly implies that there is more
52. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
54. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
55. IM. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). Justice Kennedy had
used similar language in his opinion in County of Allegheny v., ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989), although there he had suggested that the "tending to establish" alternative would
be limited to situations in which the government had provided substantial "direct benefits"
to religion. See id at 659 (Kennedy, I., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) ("[G]ovenmment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion
or its exercise; and it may not . . . give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that
it in fact 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.'") (quoting
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
1993]
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to the Establishment Clause than coercion, a conclusion amply
supported by Kennedy's analysis of the case at hand.
In identifying the "dominant facts" that "mark and control the
confines of our decision,"56 Justice Kennedy emphasized the prob-
lem of coercion, but not before he highlighted the nature and ex-
tent of the government's involvement with the challenged prayers:
"State officials direct the performance of a formal religious exer-
cise at promotional and graduation ceremonies for secondary
schools." 57 Kennedy then devoted approximately half of his sub-
stantive analysis to a discussion of the government's involvement
with religion in the case at hand and why this involvement was
constitutionally problematic.
At the outset of this discussion, Justice Kennedy noted that
"[t]he government involvement with religious activity in this case
is pervasive, to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-
directed religious exercise in a public school."58 "That involve-
ment," he continued, "is as troubling as it is undenied." 59 He not-
ed that the school principal, a state official, decided that the
prayers of invocation and benediction should be given and chose
the clergyman who would offer them.6° In addition, the principal
advised the clergyman that his prayers should be nonsectarian and
provided him with a pamphlet containing general guidelines for
their composition. "Through these means," according to Kennedy,
"the principal directed and controlled the content" of the prayers
that were offered. 61 This violated a "cornerstone principle" of the
Establishment Clause because "'it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the
American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried
on by government."' 62
Justice Kennedy recognized that nonsectarian prayers may
serve a valid purpose in our society, but he stated that the First
Amendment does not "permit the government to undertake that task
for itself. '63 "IT]he central meaning of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment," he wrote, "is that all creeds must be tolerated
56. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
57. Id
58. Id.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id. at 2656.
62. Id (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)).
63. Id.
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and none favored,"" and he found that this principle permitted no
exception for a nonsectarian creed.65 Kennedy noted that although
nonreligious speech is fully protected even when the government
participates, "[in religious debate or expression the government is
not a prime participant, for the Framers deemed religious establish-
ment antithetical to the freedom of all."' The Establishment
Clause, he continued, "is a specific prohibition on forms of state
intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the
speech provisions" of the First Amendment.67
Having discussed the nature and extent of the government's
involvement with religion, Justice Kennedy turned to the problem
of coercion. Noting the "subtle coercive pressure" of the public
school environment and the "risk of indirect coercion," he conclud-
ed that students at the graduation ceremony faced "public pressure,
as well as peer pressure," 6' and that these were pressures for
which the government was properly held accountable.69 Kennedy's
"coercion" analysis, however, suggested that he actually was con-
cerned not only about coercive injuries, but also about injuries that
are better described as noncoercive.
Justice Kennedy recognized that.in the context of a graduation
prayer, dissenting students might be coerced in one of two ways.
First, a student might object to the prayer, but feel pressure to join
the prayer nonetheless, that is, to pray silently along with the rest
of the group as the clergyman speaks aloud. Thus, the student
might feel "that she is being forced by the State to pray in a man-
ner her conscience will not allow." 71 Second, the student's con-
science might require that he or she not only refuse to join the
prayer, but also refuse to stand with the group, or even refuse to
"maintain respectful silence." 71 In each of these situations, the
dissenting student feels pressure to make a decision that his or her
conscience does not permit. The injury suffered, therefore, can
fairly be described as coercive.
Justice Kennedy also expressed concern about a different type
64. Id. at 2657.
65. See id.
66. Id,
67. IM. at 2657-58.
68. Id at 2658.
69. See i&d at 2659 ([Mhe government may no more use social pressure to enforce
orthodoxy than it may use more direct means.").
70. Id at 2658.
71. Id
1993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
of injury, however, an injury that is more difficult to characterize
as coercive. Some dissenters might not feel pressure to join the
prayer, and they might not object to standing or maintaining si-
lence. As Kennedy observed, "some persons who have no desire to
join a prayer have little objection to standing as a sign of respect
for those who do."7 2 This kind of dissenter faces no "conflict of
conscience" 3 in the ordinary sense, but Kennedy sees a potential
injury nonetheless, especially in the context of a public school
graduation. This injury flows from the risk that others might
misperceive the dissenter's cooperation, viewing it not as an act of
respect for those who pray, but rather as active participation, or at
least approval:
There can be no doubt that for many, if not most, of the
students at the graduation, the act of standing or remaining
silent was an expression of participation in the Rabbi's
prayer .... What matters is that, given our social conven-
tions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe
that the group exercise signified her own participation or
approval of it. 4
In describing "[t]he injury caused by the government's action,"
Kennedy mentioned not only the pressure for "participation," but
also the "embarrassment" that a dissenting student might suffer.7 5
At least in part, this embarrassment would arise from the realiza-
tion that others might mistakenly believe that one had "signified"
the approval of religious beliefs that he or she actually does not
share.7
6
Justice Kennedy also described other injuries that would ap-
pear to be noncoercive. He noted that the Court must assume that
"the prayers were offensive to the student and the parent who now
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2660.
74. Id. at 2658. Compare id. at 2656 (suggesting that a dissenting student could not
realistically avoid "the fact or appearance of participation") with id. at 2682 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for suggesting that "the dissenter's interest in avoiding
even the false appearance of participation constitutionally trumps the government's interest
in fostering respect for religion generally").
75. Id at 2659.
76. The embarrassment arising from the false appearance of participation might extend
beyond the individual dissenter. As Professor Garvey notes, a dissenter's participation in a
religious exercise can become a scandal for the dissenter's co-religionists. See John H.
Garvey, Cover Your Ears, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 761, 763 (1993). Such a scandal,
moreover, could arise from even the false appearance of participation.
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object,"' and he argued that this offensiveness heightened "the
intrusion of the religious exercise." The nonsectarian character of
the prayers, he continued, "does not lessen the offense or isolation
to the objectors. At best it narrows their number, at worst increases
their sense of isolation and affront."
79
To be sure, these kinds of injuries can be connected to a test
of coercion. On this view, a dissenter might have no objection of
conscience to standing and remaining silent during a prayer, but
might nonetheless prefer to avoid the embarrassment, the offense,
the affront, and the sense of isolation that might arise from the
clergyman's recitation of the prayer and from the misperceptions of
one's peers. As a result, the dissenter might be coerced to stay
away from the graduation ceremony altogether. Conversely, because
"high school graduation is one of life's most significant occa-
sions,"8" the dissenter might feel coerced to attend the ceremony
nonetheless, and thereby to submit to the noncoercive injuries that
Justice Kennedy has described. But under this kind of analysis, the
question of coercion depends upon the prior identification of
noncoercive injuries, as well as an implicit determination that such
injuries are cognizable under the Establishment Clause. Otherwise,
the dissenter's dilemma would not be a matter of constitutional
concern. It seems that the tail is wagging the dog.
IV
Professor Paulsen suggests that Justice Kennedy actually
adopted a test of coercion in Weisman, and that he rejected the
more pragmatic, multi-faceted approach of Lemon."1 On this view,
Kennedy's discussion of noncoercive injuries was not only con-
fusing, but was also gratuitous. Likewise gratuitous was Kennedy's
extensive discussion of the nature and extent of the government's
involvement in the prayers that were offered.
It may be that large portions of Justice Kennedy's opinion
were superfluous, but there is another, more likely possibility.
Kennedy clearly was concerned about coercion, but he also was
77. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2659.
78. d
79. Id Cf Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False Claim
about the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37, 63 (1991) ("The attempt to be
inclusive amplifies the message of exclusion to those left out.").
80. Weisman, 112 S. CL at 2659.
81. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 819-21.
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concerned about noncoercive governmental action and the injuries
that it can cause. Rather than a test of coercion, I believe that
Kennedy was applying a more pragmatic approach, an approach in
the nature of a Lemon inquiry. In accordance with such an ap-
proach, Kennedy considered the extent to which the state had spon-
sored or endorsed a religious exercise by involving itself in the
composition and presentation of the prayers. Under the traditional
Lemon formula, this analysis could be tied to the first and third
prongs of the test, which focus on the government's purpose and
the degree of its entanglement with religion. 82 Consistent with the
second prong of Lemon, Kennedy also considered the effects of the
government's action, including the coercive and noncoercive effects
on religious and irreligious minorities.83 In addressing these ef-
fects, some of Kennedy's language was reminiscent of Justice
O'Connor's alternative formulation of Lemon's second prong. Al-
though he carefully avoided the "endorsement or disapproval" lan-
guage that he had previously disavowed," Kennedy focused his
attention on the "reasonable perception[s]" of a "reasonable dissent-
er."85 In addition, Kennedy noted the "potential for divisiveness"
that might arise from the government's action, a consideration
that the Court had recognized in Lemon as a potentially relevant
factor.8
7
Other aspects of Justice Kennedy's opinion suggest a vision of
the Establishment Clause that is closer to Lemon than to an ap-
proach based purely on coercion. Thus, although he regards reli-
gion as "precious" 8 and therefore subject to "accommodation," 89
Kennedy plainly is wary of affirmative governmental efforts to sup-
port it. In part, his suspicion is linked to a concern about coercion,
coupled with a belief that noncoercive governmental action may be
a step in the wrong direction: "[Tihe lesson of history . . . [is] that
82. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
84. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 677 (1989) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
85. See Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658; see also Paulsen, supra note 3, at 863 n.227
(noting the similarity between this language and the language used under Justice
O'Connor's approach).
86. Kennedy focused especially on "the potential for divisiveness over the choice of a
particular member of the clergy to conduct the ceremony." Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
87. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971).
88. See Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2656.
89. See id at 2661.
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in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant ex-
pression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and
coerce." 9' In addition, however, Kennedy wants to protect the
"'purity and efficacy'" of religion itself.9 ' According to Kennedy,
the Religion Clauses work to ensure this end by committing the
"preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship...
to the private sphere," free from the corruption of "government
interference." 92
Justice Kennedy's approach is both context-specific and non-
categorical. He emphasizes that his opinion in Weisman is limited
to the public school context.93 More generally, he describes his
approach to the Establishment Clause as one that requires consider-
ations of degree. "Our jurisprudence in this area," he writes, "is of
necessity one of line drawing, of determining at what point a
dissenter's rights of religious freedom are infringed by the
State." 9' This line drawing, he suggests, requires the Court to dis-
tinguish between inconsequential governmental involvement with
religion and governmental actions that "'directly or substantially
involve the state in religious exercises or in the favoring of reli-
gion [so] as to have meaningful and practical impact.'" 95
To say that Kennedy's opinion suggests a pragmatic approach
in the nature of a Lemon inquiry is hardly to say that it advocates
a strict separation of church and state. The Lemon test is vague
and indeterminate. It permits different judges to reach different
results in particular applications even as they adhere to the very
same framework of analysis. In considering the purpose and effect
of governmental action, as well as the government's entanglement
with religion, Justice Kennedy is likely to be more permissive than
many Supreme Court justices, both past and present. He might go
so far as to overrule some, or perhaps even many, of the Court's
prior applications of the Lemon test. Indeed, he might even dis-
90. Id. at 2658.
91. k. at 2657 (quoting 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Reli-
gious Assessments, in THE WRnNGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1901)).
92. Id. at 2656-57. Much to the dismay of Justice Scalia, Kennedy had little to say
about another factor that the Court has often considered in its Establishment Clause
decisionmaldng - the role of societal tradition. See id at 2678 (Scalia, I., dissenting)
C(today's opinion ...is conspicuously bereft of any reference to history-).
93. See id at 2661.
94. Id
95. Id (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963)
(Goldberg, J., concurring)).
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pense with the Lemon formula altogether, believing that in light of
past applications, it connotes an unnecessarily rigid separation of
religion and government."
Whatever the course of his future decisiomnaking, however,
Justice Kennedy honored the spirit of Lemon in his opinion for the
Court in Lee v. Weisman. He applied a pragmatic approach that
was multi-faceted and that included both qualitative and quantita-
tive assessments. In considering issues of purpose, effect, and en-
tanglement, Kennedy focused not only on the harm of governmen-
tal coercion, but also on other injuries that dissenters might incur,
and he noted that in the hands of government, even the favored
religion might suffer.
This kind of multiple-variable, context-specific approach is the
essence of Lemon. And so Lemon lives, at least in spirit, at least
for now.
96. It remains to be seen how Justice Kennedy will interpret the Establishment Clause
in future cases, including those that are pending before the Supreme Court as this article
goes to press. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 113 S.
Ct. 51 (1992), granting cert. to 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992); Zobrest v. Catalina Foot-
hills School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992), granting cert. to 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1992).
Speaking for the majority in Weisman, Justice Kennedy explicitly declined to reconsider
Lemon. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text. Even
so, Kennedy did not reaffirm or rely upon the Lemon formula as such. Further, in County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), Justice Kennedy implied that he might be
prepared to dispense with the Lemon test and some of the precedents that have arisen
from its application. See id at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). More recently, however, in a decision announced less than a week
after Weisman, Kennedy has emphasized the importance of stare decisis. Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 112 S. CL 2791, 2808-16 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter, JJ.); see Ronald C. Kahn, God Save Us From The Coercion Test: Constitutive
Decision-Making, Polity Principles, and Religious Freedom, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
983, 1009 (1993) (suggesting that Kennedy's opinion in Casey might have implications
for his decisionmaking under the Establishment Clause).
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